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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Under the test established in Hutchinson v. 
Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) , may a finding that a natural 
parent lacks two of the three characteristics giving rise to the 
presumption in favor of awarding custody to a parent over a non-
parent support the conclusion that the presumption has been 
rebutted. 
B. Does the evidence support the trial courtfs findings 
that the defendant Richard B. Kishpaugh: 
1. Lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the 
child that is characteristic of parents generally; and 
2. Has failed to sacrifice his own interest and welfare 
for the child's interest and welfare. 
C. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct 
Kishpaugh what he should do in the future to obtain custody of 
Brian. 
D. If the parental presumption has been rebutted, is it 
in the childfs best interest that the petitioners William and 
Kathryn Kornmayer be awarded custody. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal by the defen-
dant Richard B. Kishpaugh from an order awarding custody of the 
minor child, Brian, to his maternal grandparents, William and 
Kathryn Kornmayer. 
B. Course of the Proceedings, 
The plaintiff Karla Kishpaugh (Plaintiff) was awarded 
custody of Brianf born February 18, 1976, under the decree of 
divorce entered June 25, 1981. The defendant Richard Kishpaugh 
(Kishpaugh) petitioned the court on April 27, 1984 to modify the 
decree so that he might obtain custody of Brian. The petitioners 
William and Kathryn Kornmayer (Petitioners) also filed a petition 
for custody, after it was determined Plaintiff would be unable to 
care for Brian due to illness. The hearing on both petitions 
came on before the Honorable Dean E. Conder of the Third Judicial 
District Court on November 22, 1984. 
C. Disposition in the District Court. 
On December 7, 1984, the District Court entered an order 
awarding custody to Petitioners, after finding that the presump-
tion in favor of awarding custody to a parent over a nonparent 
had been rebutted, and that it was in Brian's best interest that 
Petitioners be awarded custody . 
D. Statement of Material Facts. 
Brian was born February 18, 1976 and is the sole issue 
of the marriage of Kishpaugh and Plaintiff (F.F. 1). Although 
awarded custody by stipulation in the original decree of divorce 
in June, 1981, the Plaintiff has never assumed a custodial role 
(T 7,8). Since the decree of divorce, Brian has lived with his 
maternal great grandmother, Ona Landrum, and with the 
v 
Petitioners, a3 ternati ve 1 ] ( T 2;8# 29 ; F IF 2) I•»eL i, I; i,t.>net b m * 
the maternal gxandparents of Brian (T 1.*)• l"r't i tloners live in a 
niot * i 1 P 11< HUP |")H r ik 1 i, I i "11 i co Ca 1 i f o r n i a I T r»4 ,, % ) , 
been enhanced b\ Kishpaugh taking the c iid i u v i ^ c s during 
Thanksgiv:- * m • Easter recesses, together v»*h several other 
weeken , »
 A-,.t , . .•* year and extend*. .mm* * 
which inclu^" ~ x weeks ^ - a i > ^  ree and *>«- . weeks 
i• Iui" :i i Ig t: There ib xuvtr ' t -
ween Bria.i x . , Kishpaugh whi* < lower court has characterised 
as "deep love 1
 x* , , _•_. . , . 
Shortly after the decree of divorce Kishpaugh quit his 
job :i i :i SaJ t Lake Citj ai id move :I tc Rei r :::),, Ne1 ::::] os- 2r t: :: 
Brian and to Kishpaugh's fami 1 y so that his family could care for 
;
 * v . v i staying with Kishpaugh 
(T 82, r it . doing ^', Kishpaugh quit his job of 
four year- * - *- * » *- ^ r ^ i ^ v , 'tah '"">lice (T 8 2 ) . While 
B . ,. i: : te 1 iJii in 1 et , 
visi'ed nii:, . .<<a.u --i times » int w:i th Brian to school 
(r ;-~ - ~ " -ed ~ i i ! anguage to help him be~- * "om-
ninn ; -.*:._' * 4 . - 1: :nas arranqerl 1 or 
school and - :* - services designed * v t;he instruction >r the 
hp .. *: hpaugh nas also ariarn'^ wich co-
worker c I M hange 1 », v.,; schedule 10 accommodate the 1 ?u^ 
hundred mile drive to Chico, California,- and back to visit Brian 
vi 
(T 99). Kishpaugh has further sacrificed his own interests for 
Brian's welfare by terminating a close personal relationship with 
his girlfriend after she had expressed doubts about the desirabi-
lity of gaining custody of Brian (T 98). 
During the three and one-half years following the 
divorcef Kishpaugh paid.nearly $10,000.00 to the Plaintiff: 
$6,430.00 of which was support for Brian (F.F. 15). Plaintiff 
never forwarded this money to Brian, but rather used it for her 
own needs (T 20, 107). After discovering that the payments were 
not being forwarded to Brian, Kishpaugh stopped making payments 
to Plaintiff (T 106, 107; F.F. 4). Kishpaugh attempted to con-
tinue payments by sending the amount, previously agreed upon for 
child support between Kishpaugh and Plaintiff (T 104), to Brian's 
maternal great-grandmother with whom Brian was living. She 
refused the payments because they were not the amount stated in 
the stipulated decree of divorce (T 71, 106, 107). 
Due to health problems, Plaintiff will be unable to 
assume any custodial role (F.F. 16). At the time of the original 
decree of divorce Plaintiff had told Kishpaugh that Brian would 
be living with Petitioners for only a short time while Plaintiff 
finished her education (T 83). After relying upon Plaintiff's 
promises for some time and after discovering that Plaintiff could 
not assume custody, Kishpaugh sought custody, believing that 
Brian should be raised by his natural parent (T 83-85). 
After a hearing on both Kishpaugh's and Petitioners' 
petitions for custody, the Honorable Dean E. Conder of the Third 
J i i • ::1 :!i :: :i a 1 D :i s i :  i: I c t C o u i: t: a w a i: <:l e d c i i s t o d; ? :) f El i: :i a n t o P e 111 loners 
and not to Kishpaughf the natural father. The court found the 
presumption favoring the natural parent had been rebutted and 
that awarding custod5 t ::> I: e t:i t:i ::)i: 1 ers A/.JI . 111 I I ie bes t inter osts of 
Brian. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982) 
I "i t J 1 d L 1 J a L i J i I a t u r a 1 p a r e i I t a i I :1 <= > i: I ::> i I p • a r e n t A :i ] ] !:: € : . 1 
footing in a custody dispute only after the presumption .n favor 
of the natural parent uds been rebutter - &>> s - parental 
presumption, the non-parent- mu^ r - . > 
t h r e e o£ the a t t r i b u t e g e n e r a l l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o* p a r e n t s . 
T h e s e ii M- r i Ihj t o i u <x 
willingness to sacril:i.* :• * m u ^o ! : .o welfare . hh<* 
child's? and the sympathy ^ i inHetstanding of - • child that 
are gener j_ .. _ :: -t, • 
concluding \.-•• j^r-n*-.;'. oresumptic . i «> rebutted upon a 
findi ng \ • '.undid i\isnpaugh lacked only iwu OL LUC necessary 
three attributes. 
r> mur, w | a i court ^rre^ mding that Richa. ; 
Kishpaugh lacked •wo i ^ : - M--f> necessary parental attributes. 
The rec^1^1 . ; ' -*•" I *: ice 
his own intor^st,: on: welfare for his s-.>:."• in-1 :.-: devoid OL 
any evidence i- u : o -ishpaugh * * -^ M-kinq n thp sympathy for 
and understand: , .: . .- .-. . --•-; ; j.i -r.^ - v-1 , " I 
v i ii 
parents. The trial court's conclusion that the parental presump-
tion had been rebutted was, therefore, erroneous. 
C. The trial court erred in failing to provide 
Kishpaugh with a standard of improvement whereby he might regain 
custody of his son. Even an individual whose parental rights the 
State wishes to terminate is given such a standard and a six-
month probationary period before any permanent determination is 
made. The trial courtfs failure so to do made useless any future 
action by Kishpaugh to reacquire custody, since he has done all 
that the law previously required him to do, and he can do no 
better than he has done without instruction. His rights to 
custody and Brian's right to be raised by his parent have been 
rendered illusory by the trial court's error. 
D. The trial court erred in finding that Brianfs best 
interests were served by awarding custody to the Petitioners 
William and Kathryn Kornmayer. Hutchinson set forth the criteria 
found important by courts in determining the best interests of a 
child in custody disputes. The trial court's conclusion was not 
based upon any of the Hutchinson criteria. This was error. 
ix 
ARGUMENT 
THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION MAY BE REBUTTED ONLY UPON A 
FINDING THAT A NATURAL PARENT LACKS ALL THREE OF THE 
CHARACTERISTICS GIVING RISE TO THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION. 
In Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2< I 38 (Utah 1 982), 
• '• i " irt stated in a unanimous decision: 
In a controversy over custody, the paramount con-
sideration is the best interest of the child, but where 
one party to the controversy is a nonparent, there is a 
presumption in favor of the natural parent. Citation 
deleted] 
Id,, -J* 40. Hutchinson, '- -volved astody dispute between the 
-• n- - jidtaui mother * - i; ^ *, arvi th^ r^?Pnn-
dent, -; ie mat. *h~m sb^ ma^ .. vj ^ i ^ t „ ",«. ?. 
whom she later **/orced. ' * <* evidence showed she was a heavy 
1
 'i p r — 
wise neglected the ?n i • :i - " :i strict C O J L L denied custody 
u* l~ r ?hil'i »-^  * '*- f- -• - • parent thp qrounds that* w.^ in 
the best interest ol the ch.i Ld in • i w < .i i • i I,*UM Luily l„u I he mji\[ ;,i IL •=; 111. • 
Id. 
The Hutchinson court held the trial court erred i n nc t 
natural parenr JC ::-_*j, :-uuiuu before making inqu,^ ir>tr> the 
best interests of the child, I d • at 4 0 42. "The Hutchinson court 
reasoned tl lat 
The parental presumption is not conclusive, State in re 
R L , 17 Utah 2d 349, 411 P. 2d 839 
(1966), but it cannot be rebutted merely by demonstra-
ting that the oppossing party possesses superior quali-
fications, has established a^  deeper bond with the child, 
or is able to provide more desirable circumstances. If 
the presumption could be rebutted merely be evidence 
i 
that a nonparent would be a superior custodian, the 
parent's natural right to custody could be rendered 
illusory and with it the child's natural right to be 
reared, where possible, by his or her natural parent. 
Consistent with its rationale, the parental presumption 
can be rebutted only by evidence establishing that a^  
particular parent at a^  particular time generally lacks 
all three of the characteristics that give rise to the 
presumption; that no strong mutual bond exists, that 
the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacri-
fice his or her own intereast and welfare for the 
child's, and that the parent lacks the sympathy for and 
understanding of the child that is characteristic of 
parents generally. The presumption does not apply to a 
parent who would be subject to the termination of all 
parental rights due to unfitness, abandonment, or 
substantial neglect, since such a parent is a_ fortiori 
not entitled to custody. [emphasis added] 
Id. at 41. 
In the instant case the District Court found the paren-
tal presumption had been successfully rebutted based on a finding 
that Kishpaugh (1) had failed to sacrifice his own interest and 
welfare for Brian (F.F. 11 17); and (2) lacked the sympathy for 
and understanding of Brian that are characteristic of parents 
generally (F.F. 1[ 18). The District Court did not find that no 
strong mutual bond exists. Indeed, it found Kishpaugh and Brian 
have a good relationship (F.F. 11 11 3, 14) and that there is a 
deep love between Kishpaugh and Brian (F.F. 1[ 11; T 133, 
138-139) . 
Hutchinson did not state that the presumption can be 
rebutted by showing that two of the three characteristics are 
missing in a particular parent at a particular time. It stated: 
. . . the parental presumption can be rebutted only by 
2 
evidence establishing that a particular parent at a par-
ticular time generally lacks all three characteristics 
that give rise to the presumption . . . . 
Id. at II. 
Hutcni.<. • •
 2* • •• tor 
establishing whether l :,*- paienu. presumption :ta* ; ^ er- rebutted, 
and its language is cl ear, wA 1 ] three characteristics" must be 
1 a c k i r 1 g , Wl: I e i: I :i i I t e r p r e t :i i I g <= s t: <= 11 11 = :: i: c a s e :: o i 11 a :i i l :i i l g 11: i e • 3 
"all™ , the rule i s
 f generally,, that the plain meaning of tt : .e word 
will apply Thus , "the word f al 1' usual ] y does not adin.lt of an 
exception, add11 i on or e xc1u sIon. *I 7 3 Am J u r 2 d, St a t ut e s § 2 44 a t 
421. »Aii« i n such a context means "each" or "every". 
The District Court, therefore, erred ; •j*--**i:n<: istody 
a te r i: I a II g r ai id pa r e i I t s , the 
Hutchinson, 
, 11: Ie dIstrIct court addressed the question of the 
best interests of the child without first determining 
[that] the presumption in favor of the natural parent 
had been rebutted, 
lUtchinson, Cooper v_,_ DeLand, 
652 P.2d ^r . -:* vii3 t;o ;' reiterated the three-pronged 
Hutchinson test for overcoming the presumption In favor of a 
natural parent over a non-pu t"LMI 1 . C:i ti i: I g Hutchinson, the 
stated: 
A party seeking tn deprive a natural parent of 
custody of a minor child can rebut the parental presump-
tion only by evidence establishing that: "no strong 
mutual bond exists, that the parent has not demonstrated 
a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and 
welfare for the child's/ and that the parent lacks the 
sympathy for and understanding of the child that is 
characteristic generally." Only after the parental pre-
sumption has been rebutted, will the parties compete on 
equal footing, and custody shall then be granted to the 
party who will most adequately protect and promote the 
best interests of the child. 
Cooper, supray at 908-909. 
In Cooper, the noncustodial parent petitioned the court 
to obtain custody of an eight-year old child from the stepfather 
after the death of the custodial parent. The Honorable Dean E. 
Conder of the Third District held for the stepfather, finding 
that the natural father had not shown "by clear and convincing 
evidence" that it was in the child's best interests to wrest 
custody from the stepfather, with whom the child had lived for 
five years prior to the petition. Ic[., at 908. 
On appealf the Supreme Court held the district court had 
erred in not first determining whether the parental presumption 
had been rebutted before enquiring whether the child's best 
interests were served by awarding custody to either party. Id., 
at 908-909. 
The trial court has here once again awarded custody to 
the nonparent without first establishing the parental presumption 
had been rebutted. Brian lived with Mrs. Landrum and Petitioners 
for 3 1/2 years. In Cooper the child had lived with his step-
father for five years. The Hutchinson and Cooper standard is not 
"who has lived with the child longer," h'it rather, that the child 
should g< :* *•<'•:" parent unless tv presumption ha^ been 
rebutted . . . - ,< -i : ! , i* .- =; - *v-
attributes generally typical of parents. 
In Hutchinson, there was evidence to support a finding 
II L i ' I i u t t . - i ] 1  I In | 1! Min t ii I p i M i U J i n p l i ' i n , „
 llK S n \ n eiiK* C m i t t 
ordered the case remanded so the trial court could make that 
finding. In the instant case, there Is no evidence tending to 
show Kishpaugh was unf 11,,- :>i: 11: 1 at 1 ie I acked the qua] 111es typica 1 
of parents. The trial court plainly erred m failing to follow 
*" '
ie
 Hutch irmoii M n'uL'inl. 
B. THE RECORD IS DET 1 OIE OP EVIDENCE SI IPPC IF .TING THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT KISHPAUGH HAS FAILED TO SACRIFICE HIS 
OWN INTERESTS AND WELFARE FOR BRIAN fS AND THAT KISHPAUGH LACKS 
TYPICAL OF PARENTS. 
I, Kishpaugh has sacrificed his own interests and 
welfare for Brian'"' s interests and welfare. 
r . , < i 
has failed tr sacrifice .. *. interests di.ti welfare : H 
Brian's. (F.i. \ ^~,, . xi^u Ixiiuiug x^ act Lasea upon the evi™ 
s i e • 
According to the testimony heard by the District Court, 
Kishpaugh visited Brian r* -'Ui •-«-., Califc-inn, driving the 
approximately 360 miles round trip from Renof Nevada, ten to 
twelve times from 1981 - 1984. (T 86). While in Chico, 
Kishpaugh often visited Brianfs school. (T 76). 
In addition to Kishpaugh's visits to Chico to see Brian, 
Kishpaugh would drive to Chico, pick Brian up, and take him to 
Reno every Easter, Thanksgiving, and for a few weeks every 
summer. (T 77). In 1983 and 1984 Brian was in Reno 3 1/2 and 3 
weeks, respectively (T 88 - 89). Kishpaugh also writes Brian 
often: 5 - 6 times in 1983 and 10 times in 1984 (T 94). 
During the visits in Reno, Kishpaugh takes Brian camping 
and fishing, they go bike riding together, and often go to the 
park for picnics or just play (T 89). Although he does not want 
to buy his sonfs love, Kishpaugh often gives Brian gifts, 
including gifts on every birthday and every Christmas (T 94 - 95), 
including two bicycles: one for use in Reno and one for Chico (T 
96 - 97). 
Kishpaugh moved to Reno from Salt Lake City in 1981, 
giving up a job he had held with the University of Utah police 
for four years (T 82) so he could be close to Brian in Chico and 
so he could be near his family and have their help in Brian's 
care during visitation (T 102). 
Kishpaugh has learned sign language so he could better 
communicate with Brian (T 87), and has located a church and 
school in Reno which provide services for the hearing impaired. 
(T 89 - 91). 
6 
After Kishpaugh learned that Brian would li kely remain 
in Chico, rather than i n Salt Lake City with Plaintiff, he 
e x p 11 n?"pfi t' In ' i »o . 1111 I in I 
Brian. Plaintiff, threatened that if Kishpaugh took any action in 
that regard, she would take nr • *n ^erself, ouf him ^ daycare ->r 
l...iVf '* " Sy s I I I H I . I d b "iii . . - n e 
care he needed, (T 83-84) 
P r i o r t o January , 1984 , Kishpaugh paid P l a l n t i f f 
";»ii 4 III ! II :i • :!: :ii 3 • :1 : I: (I I II • • f ; ft J •! , i a \ J f 
w a r d e d t o P e t i t i o n e r s o r 0 n a L a n d r u ni for B r i a i I • s c a r e (F. F If M . 
Finally, Kishpaugh recently ended a deep personal rela-
tionship with hi s girlfriend because she was not i n favor of his 
obtaining custody of Brian, demonstrate ^  t.u.. his love : or Brian 
was greater than his ] o v e :••: , :• j l r l f i , en,; (T 9 8 ) 
A review of the foregoing testimony elucidates 
K:i st lpaugh' s ; i ] 3 iiijnr »' l a i< i if ice I H I H I I a HI III I i M j n t m l , 
1 ong trips to Chico, his wi 1 3 ingness to end a re1ationship with 
his girlfriend rather than jeopardize hi s relationship wi th his 
son, his learning to communi cate through sign language and arrange 
for Brian's scholastic and religious instruction, his payment ")f 
support,, and ; .-:*-., - > * : • . ,1 
show a very rej. Mi^ngness t* ^acrific- .
 t.-. *. . ;ietebtc and 
welfare for Brian's. The District Courtfs finding to the 
c o n 11: a i: y i s p 3 a i i i e r r o r . 
2. Kishpaugh possesses the sympathy for and understan-
ding of Brian that are characteristic of parents generally. 
The record is devoid of evidence supporting the District 
Courtfs finding that Kishpaugh lacks the sympathy for and 
understanding of Brian that are generally characteristic of 
parents (F.F. H 18). 
It is uncontroverted that Brian and Kishpaugh enjoy one 
anotherfs company (T 77-78), that Kishpaugh has made provision 
for Brian's care and instruction in Reno (T 87, 89-91), and that 
Kishpaugh is willing to terminate a relationship with his 
girlfriend because of her reluctance to support his love for 
Brian (T 98). These are not the attributes or acts of a man 
lacking a parent's sympathy and understanding. The District 
Court plainly erred in finding Kishpaugh was so lacking: his 
sympathy and understanding are as strong as any parent's, 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROVIDE 
KISHPAUGH WITH A STANDARD OF IMPROVEMENT BY WHICH HE MIGHT LATER 
OBTAIN CUSTODY OF BRIAN. 
The trial court did not give Kishpaugh any instructions 
for improving himself so that he might later overcome whatever 
deficiencies he might have and reacquire custody of Brian. This 
was error. The only direction the court gave was to "double your 
efforts and your love for this little boy." (T 140). 
Even a person whose parenthood the State wishes to ter-
minate is given some direction. In an involuntary termination 
proceeding under § 78-3A-48, Utah Code Annotated (19 53 as 
amended) and its predecessor, § 55-1-109, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended), the parent is given specific improvement cri-
teria and a six-month probationary period. Thus, if the parent 
makes the necessary changes in his or her life, the child will be 
returned and the involuntary termination proceeding dropped. 
In the instant case, Kishpaugh has worked diligently to 
provide an economically and emotionally stable environment for 
himself and Brian. He has maintained a good relationship with 
his son despite the distance between Chico and Reno. He has even 
made provision for Brian's special needs by locating schooling 
and church services for the hearing impaired in Reno. In short, 
Kishpaugh has demonstrated his willingness to do everything 
necessary to provide for Brian's physical, spiritual, and emo-
tional needs. 
It is fundamentally unfair to deny Kishpaugh custody and 
then to give him no standard for improvement. It appears the 
trial court made its decision based largely on the fact that 
Brian had lived with Ona Landrum and the Petitioners for 3 1/2 
years. (T 13 5). This circumstance was not under Kishpaugh1s 
control: Plaintiff had legal custody, but chose to have Brian 
raised elsewhere. 
It is plain error to base a determination of onefs 
worthiness as a parent on a circumstance like the length of time 
the child lived with someone else. Worse still, this cir-
cumstance remains outside Kishpaugh's control. It would seem the 
longer Brian lives with Petitioners, the less likely it is that 
Kishpaugh will ever reacquire custody. 
Even assuming arguendo that the parental presumption has 
been rebutted and Brian's best interests dictate Petitioners 
should have custody, the trial court still failed to follow the 
Hutchinson standard in failing to give Kishpaugh a standard of 
improvement. Much as a failure to find rebuttal of the parental 
presumption, the failure to instruct has effectively precluded 
Kishpaugh ever from obtaining custody, thereby rendering illusory 
"the parent's right to custody . . . [and] the child's natural 
right to be reared, when possible, by his or her natural parent." 
Hutchinson, supra, 649. P.2d at 41. 
D. IT IS IN BRIAN'S BEST INTERESTS THAT KISHPAUGH BE 
AWARDED CUSTODY. 
The Hutchinson case stated that once the parental pre-
sumption is rebutted, the parties will compete on equal footing, 
and custody awarded solely in the best interests of the child. 
Hutchinson 649 P.2d at 41. Although the Hutchinson Court stated 
an appellate court should interpose its own judgment for that of 
the trial court only when the trial court's decision is 
flagrantly unjust, the following factors were considered deter-
minative of the child's best interests: 
Some factors the court may consider in deter-
mining the child's best interests relate primarily to 
i n 
the child's feelings or special needs: the preference 
of the child; keeping siblings together; the relative 
strength of the childfs bond with one or both of the 
prospective custodians; and, in appropriate cases, the 
general interst in continuing previously determined 
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well 
adjusted. Other factors relate primarily to the 
prospective custodians1 character or status or to their 
capacity or willingness to function as parents: moral 
characater and emotional stability: duration anddepth 
of desire for custody; ability to provide personal 
rather than surrogate care; significant impairment of 
ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, 
excessive drinking, or other cause, reasons for having 
relinquished custody in the past; religious com-
patability with the child; kinship, including, in 
extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status; and 
financinal condition. (These factors are not 
necessarily listed in order of importance) [Citations 
deleted] 
Id. These factors will be considered in the order presented 
above. 
1. Preference of the child. Brian indicated he would 
prefer to live with Petitioners and Ona Landrum, with whom he 
has lived the past 3 1/2 years (F.F. 1[ 9) 
2. Siblings. Brian is an only cild, but has young 
cousins who live in Reno with whom he has established a good 
relationship. (T 116). 
3. Bond. The Court found there is a strong bond bet-
ween Brian and all the parties. (T 133, 138-139) 
4. Continuing Previous Custody. Plaintiff has had 
custody, but took no role in Brian's rearing or support: sending 
Brian to Chico to stay with her parents and grandmother while she 
remained in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff ultimately gave up her 
custodial rights, allowing Kishpaugh to assume custody by 
default. (F.F. 1 11 2, 4, 5, 8, 16). 
5. Kishpaugh's moral character and emotional stability. 
These were never at issue in this matter. 
6. Duration and depth of Kishpaugh1s desire for 
custody. Kishpaugh wanted custody from the beginning when Brian 
first went to live in Chico. Plaintiff's threats intimidated 
him, however, and he took no formal steps until he learned of 
Plaintiff's ill health. (T 83-84) 
7. Ability to provide personal care. Kishpaugh will be 
able to care for Brian every day: he works a regular shift (7:30 
- 3:30), and would have his parents' aid in the early morning and 
afternoon, immediately before and after school (T 92, 115). 
Petitioners have had Brian only on the weekends. Ona Landrum has 
cared for Brian during the week (T 28). 
8. Impairment through drugs, alcohol. None of the par-
ties drinks heavily or uses drugs, although Petitioner William 
Kornmayer does use alcohol (T 57). 
9. Kishpaugh's reasons for relinquishing custody. 
Plaintiff, Brian's mother, was awarded custody by agreement. At 
that time, Kishpaugh felt Brian should be with his mother. When 
it became clear plaintiff would not care for Brian, Kishpaugh 
first explored the possibility of obtaining custody. (T 83-84). 
10. Religious compatability. When Brian was born, both 
Kishpaugh and Plaintiff were members of the LDS faith (Mormon). 
Petitioners are Episcopalian. Further, Kishpaugh has expressed 
the desire to raise Brian in the LDS faith: Petitioners have 
expressed no opinion as to Brian's religious instruction. (T 56, 
57). 
11. Kinship. Kishpaugh is Brian's natural father, 
whereas Petitioners and Ona Landrum are his grandparents and 
great-grandmother, respectively. 
12. Financial Condition. The financial condition of 
the parties was never at issue in this matter. 
The only factor clearly not in Kishpaughfs favor is 
Brianfs wish to remain where he has been the last 3 1/2 years. 
For all the remaining factors, there is no real difference bet-
ween the parties, as with "impairment through drugs or alcohol" 
or the matter is clearly in Kishpaughfs favor, as with "kinship". 
The District Court plainly erred in finding it in 
Brian1s best interests that Petitioners be awarded custody. The 
custody evaluation done in both Kishpaughfs and the Petitioners1 
homes showed that Brian would do equally well in either environ-
ment. (T 5-7). The most superficial of anlayses of the relevant 
factors set forth in Hutchinson, supra, however, shows it would 
be in Brian's best interest that Brian be raised by his father 
and not by the Petitioners. The trial court's contrary conclu-
sion was error. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in concluding the parental pre-
sumption had been rebutted upon a finding that Kishpaugh lacks 
two of the three attributes generally characteristic of parents. 
The standard set out in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson/ 649 P.2d 38 
(Utah 1983) requires that all three characteristics be lacking 
before the presumption favoring a parent over a nonparent could 
be rebutted. 
In addition/ the trial court erred in finding Kishpaugh 
lacked two of the three attributes generally characteristic of 
parents. Such findings were not based upon the evidence. The 
trial court also erred in failing to apply the standard set out 
in Hutchinson for determining whether it was in Brian1s best 
interest that Kishpaugh be awarded custody. An analysis of the 
Hutchinson factors make clear it is in Brianfs best interests 
that Kishpaugh reassume Brian's care. 
Finally/ the trial court erred in failing to provide 
Kishpaugh with a standard of conduct/ which/ by following/ 
Kishpaugh could obtain custody of his son. The trial courtfs 
failure so to do has rendered Kishpaughfs natural right to 
custody and Brian1s right to be raised by his natural parent 
illusory. 
Respectully submitted this JT day of Ct^t/^V > 
1985. 
LARSEN, MAZURAN & VERHAAREN P.C, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By 3<^7\C>w0fc4^<^<r • ^OtVi-u^-v^ 
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until a contributor fails to pay. The Com-
mission members' salaries are not affected 
by their judicial decisions and they have no 
pecuniary reason to penalize delinquent 
contributors. Although, pursuant to § 35-
4-15, the Commission is responsible for the 
administration of the Special Administra-
tive Expense Fund where all interest and 
penalties are deposited, this interest is.too 
remote to establish any reasonable likeli-
hood of bias. 
Affirmed. No costs. 
HALL, C. J., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Rosemary HUTCHISON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Dale Hany HUTCHISON, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No- 17439. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 14, 1982. 
In a dispute between former spouses 
over the custody of a child born to the wife 
before the marriage, the Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, George £ Ballif, J., 
awarded custody to the former husband of 
a child born to the wife before the parties' 
marriage. Former wife appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Oaks, J., held that the district 
court improperly awarded custody to the 
former husband without a determination of 
whether the former wife was entitled to the 
parental presumption. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Divorce c=» 298(1) 
Standard governing actions for invol-
untary and permanent termination of all 
parental rights to child, which requires 
showing of parental unfitness, abandon-
ment or substantial neglect, is not applica-
ble to disputes between parent and nonpar-
ent over custody after parent and nonpar-
ent divorce. U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-48(a). 
2. Parent and Child o=>2(10) 
Parent may be deprived of custody on 
less compelling showing than is required for 
termination of all parental rights. U.C.A. 
1953. 7S-3a-a 10), 78-3a-48(a). 
3. Divorce s=» 298(1) 
When controversy over custody arises 
in divorce proceeding, paramount considera-
tion is best interest of child, but where one 
party to controversy is nonparent, there is 
presumption in favor of natural parent 
U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-2(10), 73-3a-48(a). 
4. Parent and Child s=»2(2, 8) 
It is rooted in common experience of 
mankind, which teaches that parent and 
child normally share strong attachment or 
bond for each other, that natural parent 
will normally sacrifice personal interest and 
welfare for child's benefit, and that natural 
parent is normally more sympathetic and 
understanding and better able to win confi-
dence and love of child than anyone else; 
therefore, in custody disputes between par-
ent and nonparent, presumption arises in 
favor of natural parent 
5. Parent and Child <*»2(8) 
In custody disputes between parent and 
nonparent, presumption in favor of natural 
parent is not conclusive, but it cannot be 
rebutted merely by demonstrating that op-
posing party possesses superior qualifica-
tions, has established deeper bond with 
child or is able to provide more desirable 
circumstances. 
& Parent and Child ^ 2 ( 8 ) 
In custody disputes between parent and 
nonparent, if presumption in favor of natu-
ral parent could be rebutted merely by evi-
dence that nonparent would be superior 
cu*t<»lian. parent's natural right to custody 
would be rendere< 
child's natural ngl 
possible, by his or I 
7. Parent and Chi! 
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would be rendered illusory and with it 
child's natural right to be reared, where 
possible, by his or her natural parent 
7. Parent and Child <*=»2(8) 
In custody disputes between parent and 
nonparent parental presumption can be re-
butted only by evidence establishing that 
particular parent at particular time gener-
ally lacks all three characteristics that give 
rise to presumption: that no strong mutual 
bond exists, that parent has not demon-
strated willingness to sacrifice his or her 
own interest and welfare for child's and 
that parent lacks sympathy for and under-
standing of child that is characteristic of 
parents generally. 
& Parent and Child <*»2(8) 
In custody dispute between parent and 
nonparent, presumption in favor of natural 
parent does not apply to parent who would 
be subject to termination of all parental 
rights due to unfitness, abandonment or 
substantial neglect, since such parent is a 
fortiori not entitled to custody. 
9. Parent and Child <*=»2(3.1) 
In custody disputes between parent and 
nonparent, if presumption in favor of natu-
ral parent is rebutted, contestants for custo-
dy compete on equal footing, and custody 
award should be determined solely by refer-
ence to best interests of child. 
10. Parent and Child *=> 2(3.1, 3JJ, 14 ,16 ) 
In custody dispute between parent and 
nonparent, after presumption in favor of 
natural parent has been rebutted, some fac-
tors court may consider in determining 
child's best interests related primarily to 
child's feelings or special needs: preference 
of child; keeping siblings together, relative 
strength of child's bond with one or more of 
prospective custodians; and, in appropriate 
c^ses, general interest in continuing previ-
ously determined custody arrangements 
where child is happy and well adjusted; 
other factors to be considered relate pri-
marily to prospective custodians' character 
or status or ability or willingness to func-
tion as parents. 
HUTCHISON Utah 3 9 
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11, Parent and Child c»2(lS) 
In custody dispute between parent and 
nonparent, assessments of applicability and 
relative weight of various factors in partic-
ular case lie within discretion of trial court 
12. Parent and Child o=»2(14) 
In custody dispute between parent and 
nonparent, trial court must enter specific 
findings on factors relied upon in awarding 
custody. 
11 Divorce <3»30l 
In dispute between former spouses over 
custody of child born to wife before mar-
riage, district court improperly awarded 
custody of child born to wife before mar-
riage to former husband without first de-
termining whether former wife was enti-
tled to benefit of parental presumption. 
Richard B. Johnson, Provo, for plaintiff 
and appellant 
Wayne B. Watson, Orem, for defendant 
and respondent 
OAKS, Justice: 
This controversy between former spouses 
over the custody of a child bom to the wife 
before their marriage requires us to clarify 
the legal standard governing a child-custo-
dy dispute between a parent and a nonpar-
ent 
Appellant, Rosemary, gave birth to Lacey 
Hutchison in February, 1975. In Septem-
ber, 1975, Rosemary married respondent 
Dale Hutchison. Two more children were 
bom during the course of their marriage: 
In February, 1980, the parties were divorc-
ed Trial evidence showed that Dale had 
damaged property, struck Rosemary, and 
harshly disciplined the children. Other evi-
dence showed that Rosemary was a heavy 
drinker, had left home for days at a time 
without explanation, and had neglected the 
children. Dale was granted temporary cus-
tody of all three children, but the resolution 
of permanent custody was deferred pending 
a blood test on Lacey's paternity and home 
evaluations by the Department of Family 
Services (DFS). The blood test excluded 
Dale as Lacey's father. 
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Thereafter, on November 12, 1980, the 
district court granted Dale permanent cus-
tody of all three children, subject to reason-
able visitation rights in Rosemary. The 
order was not accompanied by formal find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. In a 
memorandum decision, the district court 
stated that Dale's name appears on Lacey's 
birth certificate; that he has "in every 
way" treated the child as his own; and 
that, although the blood test excluded him 
as Lacey's natural father, she considers him 
her father both psychologically and biologi-
cally.1 Based on trial testimony and on 
reports of a psychiatrist and a DFS social 
worker, the court determined "that the best 
interests of the minor children would be 
served by their placement with the defend-
ant [Dale] and that all three children should 
remain together for their mutual benefit 
and well-being/* The memorandum deci-
sion further stated: 
[I]n weighing the interests of the minor 
children in this situation the welfare of 
the three is paramount over any superior 
right the plaintiff [Rosemary] may have 
to the custody of the child where it is 
determined that the defendant [Dale] is 
the better custodial parent for his two 
natural children by the plaintiff, as well 
as the child in question [Lacey]. 
Rosemary challenges only that portion of 
the order granting Lacey's custody to Dale. 
Specifically, she contends that the mother 
of an illegitimate child cannot be deprived 
of custody of her child absent a showing of 
unfitness or abandonment 
[1] We cannot agree with either the dis-
trict court's or Rosemary's characterization 
of the standard governing custody disputes 
between a parent and a nonparent The 
court's standard was solely the best inter-
ests of the child. The standard Rosemary 
advocates is, in effect, the standard govern-
I. However, Dale states in his brief that he 
"does not here seek custody is one who has 
allegedly adopted the child by acknowledge-
ment" but rather "as a third party with whom 
che child should be placed m the best interest 
of the child." 
ing actions for involuntary and permanent 
termination of all parental rights to a child, 
which requires a showing of parental unfit-
ness, abandonment, or substantial neglect 
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3a-48(a) (1965); In re J. 
R.S48P 2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
[2] Loss of custody is less drastic than 
the permanent termination of parental 
rights. The custody determination is not 
permanent, since it expires automatically 
when the child comes of age, and it is 
reversible prior to that time. Most impor-
tantly, loss of custody does not deprive the 
noncustodial parent of all rights in relation 
to the child. See U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3a-
2(10); In re J. P., supra, n. 1. For these 
reasons, a parent may be deprived of custo-
dy on a less compelling showing than is 
required for termination of all parental 
rights. 
[3,4] In a controversy over custody, the 
paramount consideration is the best interest 
of the child, but where one party to the 
controversy is a nonparent, there is a pre-
sumption in favor of the natural parent 
Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah i, 1© P.2d 97 
(1946).2 This presumption recognizes "the 
natural right and authority of the parent to 
the child's custody '* State in re Jen-
nings, 20 Utah 2d 50, 52, 432 R2d 379, 380 
(1967). It is rooted in the common experi-
ence of mankind, which teaches that parent 
and child normally share a strong attach-
ment or bond for each other, that a natural 
parent will normally sacrifice personal in-
terest and welfare for the child's benefit, 
and that a natural parent is normally more 
sympathetic and understanding and better 
able to win the confidence and love of the 
child than anyone else. Walton v. Coffman, 
110 Utah at 13, 169 P.2d at 103. 
X This statement of the standard is typical of 
many American jurisdictions. For a survey of 
jurisdictions, see Comment. "Psychological 
Parents vs. Biological Parents: The Courts' Re* 
sponse to New Directions in Child Custody 
Dispute Resolution," 17 J. of Fam.L 545, 552-
74 (1979). See *lso Annoc., 31 A.LR.3d U87 
(1970). 
HUTCHISON v. 
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[5,6] The parental presumption is not 
conclusive, State in re R f. 17 
Utah 2d 349, 411 P.2d 839 (1966), but it 
cannot be rebutted merely by demonstrat-
ing that the opposing party possesses supe-
rior qualifications, has established a deeper 
bond with the child, or is able to provide 
more desirable circumstances. If the pre* 
sumption could be rebutted merely by evi-
dence that a nonparent would be a superior 
custodian, the parent's natural right to cus-
tody could be rendered illusory and wjth it 
the child's natural right to be reared, where 
possible, by his or her natural parent. 
[7,8] Consistent with its rationale, the 
parental presumption can be rebutted only 
by evidence establishing that a particular 
parent at a particular time generally lacks 
all three of the characteristics that give rise 
to the presumption: that no strong mutual 
bond exists, that the parent has not demon-
strated a willingness to sacrifice his or her 
own interest and welfare for the child's, 
and that the parent lacks the sympathy for 
and understanding of the child that is char-
acteristic of parents generally. The pre-
sumption does not apply to a parent who 
would be subject to the termination of all 
parental rights due to unfitness, abandon-
ment, or substantial neglect, since 3uch a 
parent is a fortiori not entitled to custody. 
[9] If the presumption in favor of the 
natural parent is rebutted, the contestants 
for custody compete on equal footing, and 
the custody award should be determined 
3. Henderson v. Henderson. Utah, 576 P.2d 1289 
(1978). 
4> Jorjensen v. Jorgensen, Utah, 599 P.24 510 
(1979) (Crockett, C J., concurring); Wilton v. 
Cotfmmn. 110 Utah 1, 169 P2d 97 (1946). 
& Walton v. Coffmmn, note 4, supra. 
C Nlehen r. Nielsen, Utah. 620 P2d 511, 512 
(1980); In re Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 296, 410 P 2d 
475 (1966); Application of Coade, 10 Utah 2d 
25,147 P2d 359 (1959). 
7. Kallma V. KMIIM* UUh, 614 P.2d 641 (1980); 
Knjpp
 v. Knapp, 73 Utah 268. 273 P. 512 
(1928); Jorgensen v. Jorgensen.- note 4. suprm. 
*• Sute m rr R I 17 Utah 2d 
^49, 411 P2d 839 (1966); Wilton v. Coffmatu 
note 4. supra. 
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solely by reference to the best interests of 
the child. 
[10] Some factors the court may con-
sider in determining the child's best inter-
ests relate primarily to the child's feelings 
or special needs: the preference of the 
child;' keeping siblings together;4 the rel-
ative strength of the child's bond with one 
or both of the prospective custodians; * and, 
in appropriate cases, the general interest in 
continuing previously determined custody 
arrangements where the child is happy and 
well adjusted.1 Other factors relate pri-
marily to the prospective custodians' char-
acter or status or to their capacity or will-
ingness to function as parents: moral char-
acter and emotional stability;7 duration 
and depth of desire for custody;• ability to 
provide personal rather than surrogate 
care; f significant impairment of ability to 
function as a parent through drug abuse, 
excessive drinking, or other cause; l t rea-
sons for having relinquished custody in the 
past; l l religious compatibility with the 
child;l2 kinship,13 including, in extraordina-
ry circumstances, stepparent status; w and 
financial condition.l$ (These factors are not 
necessarily listed in order of importance.) 
[11] Assessments of the applicability 
and relative weight of the various factors in 
a particular case lie within the discretion of 
the trial court. "Only where trial court 
action is so flagrantly unjust as to consti-
tute an abuse of discretion should the appel-
late forum interpose ita own judgment." 
ft. Lembach v. Cox. Utah, 639 P.2d 197 (1961). 
16. Kiilas V. Kallax note 7, supra; Walton v. 
Coffman, note 4, suprm. 
11. Application of Conde. note 6, supra; Said-
win v. NIeiaon. 110 Utah 172. 170 P2d 179 
(1946). 
12. See U.C.A.. 1953, § 7S-3a-39<12). 
13. In re Cooper, note 6, suprm. 
14. Cnbble v. Cribble. Utah, 563 P 2d 64 (1978). 
15. Walton v. Coffman* note 4, suprm. 
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Jorgeruen v. Jorgensen, Utah, 599 P.2d 510, 
512 (1979). 
[12] The trial court must enter specific 
findings on the factors relied upon in 
awarding custody. In Chandler v. West, 
Utah, 610 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1980), we set 
aside an order that refused to modify a 
property settlement provision in a divorce 
decree but did not enter written findings. 
In remanding, we stated: uFor this Court 
to be in a position to review the propriety 
of the trial court's order, it is necessary that 
proper findings of fact and conclusions of 
law be made pursuant to Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure." In Stoddard v. 
Stoddard, Utah, 642 ?2A 743 (1982), we 
required written findings to accompany an 
order modifying a child support provision in 
a divorce decree. This requirement of writ-
ten findings applies with even greater force 
to orders awarding or modifying the custo-
dy of a child. 
[13] In this case, the district court ad-
dressed the question of the best interests of 
the child without first determining whether 
the presumption in favor of the natural 
parent had been rebutted. On the present 
record—especially in the absence of find-
ings of fact—we are unable to determine 
whether, under the standard discussed in 
this opinion, Rosemary is entitled to the 
benefit of the parental presumption. We 
therefore vacate the court's order and re-
mand for further proceedings (including the 
taking of additional evidence, if necessary) 
consistent with this opinion. No costs 
awarded. 
HALL, C. J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ„ concur. 
O | tniU«tClSYlTtt t> 
Harry J. CHRISTIANSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant; 
v. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and John 
G. Miller, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No- 17250. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 15, 1982. 
Action was filed arising from traffic 
accident Upon jury finding that plaintiff 
was 70 percent negligent and the defend-
ants 30 percent negligent, the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., 
entered judgment of "no cause of action** in 
favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., 
held that: (1) trial court did not err in 
refusing to give plaintiff a default judg-
ment against one defendant when that de-
fendant failed to appear at trial; (2) giving 
of sudden peril instruction was proper; and 
(3) trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to amend complaint to allow plain-
tiff to plead willful and wanton negligence 
on part of one defendant and to seek puni-
tive damages. 
Affirmed. 
L Appeal and Error «*» 1001(1) 
Jury finding in suit arising from traffic 
accident that plaintiff was 70 percent negli-
gent and defendants were 30 percent negli-
gent, thereby precluding recovery of dam-
ages by the plaintiff, was supported by 
competent evidence, and thus jury verdict 
would not be disturbed by the Supreme 
Court ConstArt 3, § 9. 
1 Negligence *»142 
Jury verdict in suit arising from traffic 
accident that plaintiff was 70 percent negli-
gent and defendants were 30 percent negli-
gent, thereby precluding recovery of dam-
ages by the plaintiff, was not the result of 
sympathy, bias, passion and prejudice. 
APPENDIX B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KARLA KISHPAUGH, : 
Plaintiff, : 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs. : 
CIVIL NO. D 80-1577 
RICHARD BRUCE KISHPAUGH, : 
Defendant. : 
This case presents one of the most difficult decisions 
this court has had to make. Not that the facts are that difficult 
nor is the law that complicated, but the emotional concern 
for the subject of this case presents the gravest of concern. 
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced on June 25, 1981. 
The plaintiff was awarded custody of their minor child Brian 
Kishpaugh (Brian). Brian was a handicapped child being afflicted 
with cerebral palsy. Immediately after the divorce the plaintiff 
placed Brian with her parents who have cared and raised him 
since the divorce. His material great-grandmother has also 
been involved in his care and rearage. 
The defendant lives in Reno Nevada, and the maternal 
grandparents live in Chico, California. The defendant has 
enjoyed a good relationship with Brian during the past three 
and one-half years by taking him during Thanksgiving holidays 
and for a week or two in the summer of each year. However, 
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it is also true that the defendant has failed to pay his support 
payments for Brian's care. Essentially, Brian has been reared 
by his maternal grandparents and great-grantrnother• His mother 
(plaintiff) is a medical doctor but has suffered serious health 
problems which she admits make it impossible for her to assume 
the custodial role. 
This court had the pleasure of interviewing Brian in 
chambers. Brian is mute but has mastered the sign language 
and is able to communicate by this means. An interpreter 
was present and assisted the court in communicating with Brian. 
Brian expressed his love for his father (defendant) and for 
his grandparents. He told me about his school and friends 
and what he does during his visits with the defendant as well 
as what he does in his spare time which he has with the grandparents. 
At the conclusion of the interview I asked Brian where he 
preferred to live and he responded that he preferred to live 
with Papa and Mummie (his grandparents). Obviously, a deep 
bond of love exists between Brian and his grandparents. He 
also has a love for his father. 
The real issue in this case is what is for the best interest 
of Brian (see Cooper v. DeLand, 652 P2d 907 and Hutchinson 
v. Hutchison, 649 P2d 38). After much consideration, this 
court concludes that it is for the best interest of Brian 
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that Mr. and Mrs. William Kornmayer be granted the custody 
of Brian for the present time. Defendant is to have liberal 
visitation with Brian and the court urges him to create an 
even greater bond between himself and Brian. 
Dated this day of November, 1984. 
DEAN E . CONDER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPENDIX C 
JANE ALLEN (Bar #45) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FORa 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KARLA KISHPAUGH (KORNMAYER), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD BRUCE KISHPAUGH, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Judge Dean E* Conder) 
Civil No. D80-1577 
This matter came on for trial the 22nd day of November, 
1984, before the Honorable Dean E. Conder. The natural mother, 
above-named Plaintiff, was present, along with her parents, Mr. 
and Mrs. William Kornmayer, who are the Petitioners for 
guardianship of the minor child, in Case No. P84-1Q46 which has 
been joined with this action, as was their counsel, Jane Allen, 
Esq. The Defendant was present with his attorney, Michael Z. 
Hayes, Esq. 
William Kornmayer, Karla Kornmayer, Ona Landrum, 
Richard Kishpaugh, and Mr. and Mrs. Dean Kishpaugh were called as 
witnesses. Mrs. Kornmayer's testimony was accepted by proffer, 
as was part of Mrs. Kishpaugh's testimony. The minor child, 
Brian Kishpaugh, was interviewed by the Court in chambers along 
with an interpreter for the minor child who is hearing impaired. 
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After hearing testimony of the witnesses and arguments 
of counsel at the trial in this matter, and after a hearing 
regarding Defendant's Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was held on the 18th day of December, 1984 at 
which counsel for both parties was present, with the Court's 
changes in the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
included herein, the Court now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The minor child was born February 18, 1976 and is 
handicapped with cerebral palsy and a hearing impairment. 
2. The minor child has resided with Petitioners, Mr. 
and Mrs. Kornmayer, and his maternal great-grandmother, Ona 
Landrum since June of 1981, which was when the Plaintiff and 
Defendant were divorced. 
3. The minor child and the Defendant have a good 
relationship one with another which has been enhanced by the 
Defendant taking the child for visits during the Thanksgiving and 
Easter recesses, together with several other weekend visits 
during the year and extended summer visitation, which included 
six weeks in 1984 and approximately three weeks during the summer 
of 1983. 
4. The child support payments made by Defendant to 
Plaintiff were not forwarded by Plaintiff to either her 
grandmother or her parents. 
5. The child's behavior and ability to communicate 
have improved greatly since he went to live with Petitioners. 
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6. Petitioners and the child's great-grandmother have 
hired tutors and arranged for the child to attend summer school 
and camp. 
7. The child's maternal great-grandmother has been 
involved with Brian's care and rearage since June of 1981. 
8* The child has been reared by his maternal 
grandparents and great-grandmother, and they have provided a fit 
and proper home for the child. 
9. The minor child wishes to live with Petitioners, 
Mr. and Mrs. Kornmayer. 
10. A deep bond of love exists between the mirror child 
and his grandparents. 
11. There is love between the Defendant and his son. 
12. There is a stronger bond between the minor child 
and the Petitioners than with the defendant. 
13. The Petitioners have done a fantastic job of 
caring for this child. 
14. The Defendant nas had a good relationship witn tne 
minor child and has taken the child for visits during 
Thanksgiving and a week or two in the summer of each year. 
15. Defendant has failed to make all of his support 
payments for Brian's care and has paid a total of approximately 
$9,837.00 to the Plaintiff for child support and alimony, 
$6,430.00 of which should be allocated to child support. 
16. The Plaintiff has health problems which make it 
impossible for her to assume a custodial role at this time* 
17. Defendant has failed to sacrifice his own interest 
and welfare for the child's interest and welfare. 
18. Defendant lacks the sympathy for and understanding 
of the child that is charactisteric of parents generally. 
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioners have overcome the presumption in favor 
of the natural parent. 
2. It is in the best interests of the minor child that 
Petitioners be granted custody of the minor child at the present 
time. 
3. Defendant is granted liberal visitation with the 
minor child. 
DATED this day of Xle^^c^Jj*.^ > 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
a%2>—-
ON. DEAN E. CONtraR-
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, this Q^^ day of ^p^f/ltr^-*— _ 1984, to Michael Z. 
Hayes, Esq., at LARSEN, MAZURAN & VERHAAREN, 100 Boston Building, 
9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
+-OQ^^ 
JA-IO/KORN/FIN 
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